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Evidence
Marc T. Treadwell"
I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 8, 2004, the United States Supreme Court, in Crawford v.
Washington,' rendered its most significant evidence decision in a2
number of years. Since the Court's 1980 ruling in Ohio v. Roberts,
holding that the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause does not
necessarily bar the admission of out of court statements in criminal
trials, federal and state courts have increasingly allowed prosecutors to
use hearsay statements against criminal defendants if trial judges found
that the statements bore sufficient indicia of reliability. Crawfordlikely
will bring an end to that.
As the author has often commented in surveys of Georgia evidence
decisions, Georgia appellate courts have stretched Ohio v. Roberts to its
absolute limits through what has become known as the necessity
exception to the rule against hearsay8 Statements by an absent
witness to police, for example, are routinely admitted under the suspect
theory that statements to law enforcement officers are somehow
inherently reliable.4 In Crawford, the Supreme Court overruled Ohio
v. Roberts and held that out of court statements by unavailable
witnesses are not admissible at trial unless the witness is unavailable
and the defendant had prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness;
no matter how reliable the statements may be, they are not admissible
absent an opportunity by the defendant to cross-examine the declarant.5

Partner in the firm of Adams, Jordan & Treadwell, P.C., Macon, Georgia. Valdosta
State University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D.,
cum laude, 1981). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
2. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
3. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 54 MERCER L. REV. 309, 330-31 (2002).
4. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 240 Ga. App. 723, 524 S.E.2d 773 (1999).
5. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374.
*
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The precise ramifications of Crawford will take some time to sort out,
but they no doubt will be pervasive. Clearly, it would seem, Georgia's
necessity exception will fall.
The current survey period provided more evidence of an undeniable
trend in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Fewer cases had any significant discussion of evidentiary issues.
Whether this is good depends on one's perspective. For example,
criminal defense lawyers surely look back wistfully to the years when
the Eleventh Circuit minutely scrutinized district court evidentiary
decisions and freely reversed convictions on the grounds that district
courts erroneously admitted, for example, extrinsic act evidence or
evidence whose probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial
impact. Those lawyers may argue that the Eleventh Circuit and the
federal judiciary generally have become more conservative. Others,
however, will argue-that the Eleventh Circuit is simply applying the
abuse of discretion standard as it should be applied. That a district
court is wrong is not enough; the broad discretion afforded to district
judges on evidentiary issues requires a higher showing. In any event,
the fact that the Eleventh Circuit rarely overturns district court
evidentiary decisions-or for that matter vigorously debates those
decisions-is beyond dispute.
The one exception to this trend is appeals inspired by Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.6 As in past years, Daubert figured
prominently in Eleventh Circuit decisions as district courts and the
Eleventh Circuit continued to struggle in their efforts to define the
district court's role as gatekeeper-to block suspect expert testimony at
the courthouse door.
II. ARTICLE IV: RELEVANCY
As noted in prior surveys,7 Rule 403,8 once a tool frequently used by
the Eleventh Circuit to reverse convictions, has not been used successfully in recent years by defendants claiming that district courts improperly
admitted prejudicial evidence. Nevertheless, during the past two survey
periods, Rule 403 figured prominently in Eleventh Circuit decisions,9
and that was again the case during the current survey period. These
recent cases do not likely suggest a return to the days of minute scrutiny
of district court evidentiary decisions, but they may offer some help to

6. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 49 MERCER L. REV. 1027, 1032 (1998).
8. FED. R. EVID. 403.
9. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1487, 1491-92 (2003); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1399, 1399-1403 (2002).
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criminal defense lawyers attacking the admission of unduly prejudicial
evidence.
In United States v. Jernigan,10 defendant claimed he was improperly
prejudiced when his co-defendant tendered evidence that defendant was
a gang member." The Eleventh Circuit first noted that co-defendant
did not simply demonstrate that defendant was a gang member, which
the court acknowledged implied that the defendant was a "bad person,"
but rather co-defendant introduced evidence that the gang, in which
defendant was a member, often wrapped firearms in red bandanas, the
gang's color.' 2 Because ownership of a firearm found wrapped in a red
scarf was a key issue in the case, the evidence was probative of a
legitimate issue.'3 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit was concerned
about the prejudicial impact of evidence of gang membership.' 4
"Indeed, modern American street gangs are popularly associated with a
wealth of criminal behavior and social ills, and an individual's membership in such an organization is likely to provoke strong antipathy in a
jury." 5 Consequently, "the Rule 403 calculus was in [the court's] view
a close one, and the district court would have been justified in deciding
this issue either way."' 6 However, the Eleventh Circuit spent some
time acknowledging and describing the district court's unique position
to observe and determine first-hand the potential prejudicial impact of
such evidence.' Some evidentiary decisions "turn on matters uniquely
within the purview of the district court, which has first-hand access to
documentary evidence and is physically proximate to testifying witnesses
and the jury.""
Consequently, though the question was close, the
Eleventh Circuit deferred to the district court's "unique position" and
refused to overturn defendant's conviction. 19
In United States v. Dodds, ° defendant, who was charged with
possessing child pornography, claimed the admission of 66 of the 3400
pornographic pictures found in his possession was sufficiently prejudicial
to outweigh the minimal probative value of the evidence.2 ' Perhaps

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

341 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1277-78.
Id. at 1284.
Id. at 1285.
Id.
Id. at 1284-85.
Id. at 1285.
Id.
Id.
Id.
347 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 895-96.
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tipping its hand, the Eleventh Circuit first noted that Rule 403 is an
extraordinary remedy that should be invoked only sparingly and that
district courts applying the 403 balancing test should favor the
admission of relevant evidence.22 The Eleventh Circuit distinguished
cases relied on by defendant noting that in Dodds, the disputed evidence
was not extrinsic, but rather constituted the crime for which defendant
was charged." Also, the 66 pictures introduced were a fraction of the
3400 pictures found in defendant's possession. Moreover, the Eleventh
Circuit decided that Dodds was not a case in which defendant simply
had the images in his possession but had not actually viewed them.24
Although defendant denied that he looked at the pictures, other evidence
26
suggested that he had.25 The photographs were clearly probative.
The photographs depicted child pornography, and defendant knew the
pictures depicted child pornography.27 Thus, the photographs tended
to prove defendant's intent to collect such pornography.2" Under these
circumstances, the court held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it concluded that the probative value of the 66
photographs outweighed the prejudicial impact of their admission.2 9
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Harriston ° does
not directly involve Rule 403 but demonstrates that sometimes evidence
can be so prejudicial that convictions must be overturned.3 1
In
Harristonthe prosecution inexplicably adduced evidence that defendant
had been convicted of an unrelated murder. At trial, even the prosecution acknowledged that the testimony was inadmissible. Although the
district court recognized the obvious prejudicial impact of the evidence,
it denied defendant's motion for a mistrial on all counts of the indictment. 2 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that defendant was
entitled to a new trial.33

22. Id. at 897.
23. Id. at 897-99.
24. Id. at 898.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 899.
29. Id.
30. 329 F.3d 779 (11th Cir. 2003).
31. Id. at 788-89.
32. Id. at 781.
33. Id. at 789.
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III. ARTICLE V: PRIVILEGES
Both prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys should study carefully
the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Almeida.34 In
Almeida the Eleventh Circuit attempted to provide clear guidance for codefendants entering into joint-defense agreements.3 5 Two defendants,
who were charged with narcotics trafficking, entered into a joint-defense
agreement and thereafter shared voluminous information, including
work product and privileged attorney-client communications. However,
shortly before trial, one defendant, Fainberg, pleaded guilty to one count
of racketeering
and agreed to testify against his co-defendant, Almei36
da.
When Fainberg testified at trial, Almeida's attorney asked Fainberg
to recite information he had provided to Almeida's attorney. The
prosecutor objected on the grounds that the communications conveying
the information were privileged, and recounting that information in open
court would amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The
district court sustained the objection, ruling that because of defendants'
joint-defense agreement, Almeida's attorney could not use any information he obtained from Fainberg. The district court also ruled that the
government, as an interested party, had standing to object to protect the
attorney-client relationship created by the joint-defense agreement. Post
trial proceedings and discovery revealed that if Fainberg had been
allowed to testify, Fainberg would have provided information helpful to
Almeida's defense.
On appeal, Almeida primarily argued that his right to effective
representation was abridged by the district court's sweeping ruling. 8
The Eleventh Circuit, however, took a different tack. The Eleventh
Circuit first distinguished joint-defense agreements from situations in
which one attorney jointly represents two defendants.3 9 In the latter,
the guilty plea of one defendant clearly places the attorney in a position
of irreconcilable conflict.40 How, the Eleventh Circuit posited, can an
attorney vigorously cross-examine one client who has turned against his
other client without violating his duty of loyalty to one or the other?4 1

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

341 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1318.
Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1320-21.
Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1323.
Id.
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In a joint-defense agreement, however, each defendant has his own
attorney.4 2 While confidential communications made as part of the
joint defense are privileged, the attorney of one defendant does not owe
a duty of loyalty to a co-defendant because the attorney does not
represent the co-defendant.4" While those communications are privileged, the Eleventh Circuit noted that privileges can be waived, and it
announced a broad and clear rule:
We hold that when each party to a joint defense agreement is
represented by his own attorney, and when communications by one codefendant are made to the attorneys of other co-defendants, such
communications do not get the benefit of the attorney-client privilege
in the event that the co-defendant decides to testify on behalf of the
government in exchange for a reduced sentence."
To be certain that defense lawyers took note of this rule, the court
suggested that defense attorneys "should insist that their clients enter
into written joint defense agreements that contain a clear statement of
the waiver rule enunciated in this case ..

.

The Eleventh Circuit also provided some instruction to attorneys
seeking to raise-and protect-the attorney-client privilege in Bogle v.
McClure.41 In Bogle Atlanta-Fulton Public Library System employees
brought discrimination claims, and to prove their claims, relied in part
on memoranda from the Fulton County Attorney's Office providing legal
advice to library board members.47 The appeal seemed to present the
issue of whether the memoranda fell within the attorney-client privilege
exemption to Georgia's Open Records Act.4' However, the Eleventh
Circuit decided it unnecessary to address that issue. 49 Noting that a
party invoking the attorney-client privilege must prove the privileged
and confidential nature of the communications, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the library had not carried its burden.5" Although the memoranda
provided legal advice, they were not designated "privileged" or "confidential," and the library presented no evidence regarding who, if anyone,
other than the parties to the memoranda, had access to the memoranda

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1326.
Id.
332 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1358.
Id.; See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(e)(1) (2002 & Supp. 2003).
Bogle, 332 F.3d at 1358.
Id.
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or whether the parties considered the memoranda to be confidential."'
Therefore, because the library did not carry its burden of establishing
that the memoranda were both privileged and confidential, the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the memoranda. 2
IV.

ARTICLE VII: OPINION TESTIMONY

Surely many believe that the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 53 assigning district
judges the role of gatekeeper to keep "junk science" out of the courtroom,5 4 and the subsequent codification of Daubert in the Federal Rules

of Evidence,5" were beneficial developments. But others can argue that
the benefits have come at some cost. District courts conduct days-long
Daubert hearings, and appellate courts render lengthy and sometimes
arguably conflicting decisions trying to define the proper gatekeeping
role for district judges. Consequently, many question whether Daubert
has been worth the judicial resources it has cost. This question is
particularly pertinent during the current survey period. During this
period, the Eleventh Circuit twice reaffirmed the crucial role that crossexamination, the time-honored method of getting to the truth of the
matter, can play in ferreting out suspect expert testimony.5 " As an
aside, Georgia courts have repeatedly refused to adopt Dauberty,a
decision that seems prudent if for no reason other than the relatively
limited resources available to Georgia trial courts.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters /Textron 5" illustrates how time consuming and frustrating Daubert
analysis can be. In Hudgens plaintiffs sought in two separate cases to
recover damages for injuries suffered from the crash of a military
helicopter. In both cases, the district courts entered summary judgments
for defendants. Both district courts struck, for Daubertreasons, portions
of expert witness affidavits and testimony relied upon by plaintiffs. One
of the critical issues, and the issue relevant to the Daubertanalyses, was

51. Id.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
United
57.
(1999).
58.

Id.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Id. at 592-95.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
See Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2003);
States v. Frazier, 322 F.3d 1262, vacated by 343 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2003).
See, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Baker, 237 Ga. App. 292, 294, 514 S.E.2d 448, 451
328 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2003).
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whether cracks in the fuselage of the helicopter were visible or should
have been visible to inspectors.59
In analyzing the district courts' exclusions of the expert testimony, the
Eleventh Circuit relied on the often-cited Daubert test enunciated in City
of Tuscaloosa v. Harcos Chemical, Inc.,° which provides that expert
testimony is admissible if:
(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters
he intends to address; (2)the methodology by which the expert reaches
his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of
inquiry mandated in Daubert;and (3) the testimony assists the trier of
fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized
61
expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
The "majority" opinion6 2 then embarked on a detailed discussion of
the deposition and affidavit testimony excluded by one of the district
courts." One expert had opined that properly instructed inspectors
would have discovered cracks during an inspection shortly before the
crash.' The Eleventh Circuit was unsure of the precise basis for the
district court's exclusion of this testimony, but surmised that the
exclusion must have been due to the district court's erroneous conclusion
that the expert intended to testify that the cracks were visible. 5
Properly construed, however, the court read the affidavit to mean that
visible cracks would have been discovered had a particular type of
inspection been conducted, not that the cracks were actually visible.66
Based on this interpretation, the court held that the district court
abused its discretion when it struck the opinion. 6' The district court
had concluded that the expert was qualified and that his analysis was
reliable; therefore, the district court could only have excluded the
testimony based on a determination that the opinion did not satisfy the
relevance prong of Daubert analysis. 68 To meet this element of
Daubert, the testimony "'must merely constitute one piece of the puzzle
that the plaintiffs endeavor to assemble before the jury.'" 69 Because

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1331-32.
158 F.3d 548 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 562.
There was no majority, See text accompanying infra note 75.
City of Tuscaloosa, 158 F.3d at 563.
Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1338.
Id.
Id. at 1340.
Id.
Id. at 1339.
Id. at 1340 (quoting City of Tuscaloosa, 158 F.3d at 565).
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plaintiffs were attempting to prove one particular inspection was of the
type that would have led inspectors to discover the crack, the expert's
testimony that the proper performance of that inspection would have led
to the discovery of visible cracks was clearly relevant.70
Turning to the testimony of another expert, the Eleventh Circuit found
another error in the district court's understanding of the expert's
testimony. 7' However, the majority concluded that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding this testimony because even
when properly construed,
the expert's testimony did not satisfy the
72
reliability prong.
In the case of a third expert, a portion of whose testimony had been
excluded by both district courts, the Eleventh Circuit again found errors,
this time in the district courts' conclusions that the expert was not
qualified.73 However, these errors did not require reversal because
exclusion of the testimony was also mandated under the reliability
prong.74
After a lengthy discussion, the Eleventh Circuit concluded, notwithstanding all the errors in the district courts' analyses, that reversal was
not required because there was no admissible evidence that the cracks
were visible to the naked eye before the crash. 75 The court's opinion in
Hudgens was not truly a majority opinion on the Daubert issue because
two of the judges on the panel, although
concurring in the judgment, did
76
analysis.
Daubert
the
in
concur
not
The Eleventh Circuit applied an equally exacting and arduous analysis
in Quiet Technology DC-8, Inc. v.Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd. 7' but concluded that "despite the scientific complexity of the testimony in question the
district court performed its critical gatekeeping function in admirable
fashion .. . ."'8 The Eleventh Circuit opinion may provide some help
for lawyers seeking to withstand Daubert challenges. Among other
things, appellant in Quiet Technology contended that appellee's expert
improperly applied applicable scientific principles. In other words,
appellant did not question the reliability of the scientific principles
underlying the expert's opinions, but rather contended that the expert's

70. Id.
71. Id. at 1340-41.
72. Id. at 1341.
73. Id. at 1344.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1345 (Edmondson, C.J., concurring); id. (Cox, J., concurring).
77. 326 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2003).
78. Id. at 1335.
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methodology misapplied those principles.79 The Eleventh Circuit held
that the proper attack in such a situation is to vigorously cross-examine
the expert, which appellant did at trial.8 " "The identification of such
flaws in generally reliable scientific evidence is precisely the role of
cross-examination."8 ' The expert's "methods and results were discernible and rooted in real science ... [and] they were empirically testable." 2 Consequently, the expert's opinions could be tested through
cross-examination. 3
Although advocating the use of cross-examination to test questionable
expert testimony, Quiet Technology in no way diminishes the gatekeeper
role of district courts under Daubert. However, Quiet Technology does
suggest an argument to counter a Daubert challenge. If one can prove
his qualified expert is basing his opinion on valid scientific principles,
and that the challenge to the testimony really attacks the expert's
application of those principles, then Quiet Technology stands for the
proposition that the attack goes to the weight of the opinion rather than
its admissibility. Also Quiet Technology determined that in such a
situation cross-examination
is the appropriate means to challenge the
8 4
testimony.
Although Daubert and its progeny purport to require strong deference
to district courts' first-hand analyses of expert testimony, the Eleventh
Circuit in United States v.Frazier" concluded, over a strong dissent,
that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded testimony
of defendant's forensic investigator.8 6 In Frazier defendant, who was
charged with rape, wanted to adduce expert testimony that because of
the absence of evidence on the victim's body of defendant's hair, blood,
saliva, or semen, there was no forensic evidence to substantiate the
victim's claim that she had been raped. 7 The district court, in
response to the prosecution's Daubert motion, ruled that the expert could

79. Id. at 1339.
80. Id. at 1345.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1346.
83. Id. at 1345.
84. Id. at 1346.
85. 322 F.3d 1262, vacated by 344 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2003). Note that after Frazier
was decided, the Eleventh Circuit granted Frazier's motion for rehearing en banc and
vacated the panel opinion. United States v. Frazier, 344 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2003). The
reason for granting the motion was not stated. Id. at 1294.
86. Frazier, 322 F.3d at 1268.
87. Id. at 1264.
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not "draw any inferences based on the absence of evidence supporting
[the victim's] allegations of sexual assault."8 8
Faced with this ruling, defendant's attorney chose not to put the
expert on the stand, but rather established through cross-examination
of laboratory technicians that neither defendant's hair nor bodily fluids
were found on the victim's body. However, in rebuttal, the prosecution
elicited expert testimony from the laboratory technicians that the
absence of hair and bodily fluids did not necessarily mean that
defendant had not raped the victim. 89 This no doubt infuriated
defendant's counsel because he could not put up his expert to establish
the lack of forensic evidence of rape. However, the prosecution was
allowed to present surprise expert testimony that the absence of such
evidence did not undermine the victim's claim of rape.9 °
Based on the Eleventh Circuit's review of the record, the majority
concluded that the district court disallowed the expert's testimony
because the court found the expert lacked the necessary scientific
qualifications to render the disputed opinions.9 1 The Eleventh Circuit
held that this was an error.92 The district court concluded that the
expert's lack of knowledge and education rendered him incompetent to
testify.93 However, the Eleventh Circuit, noting that an expert can be
qualified by virtue of experience, concluded that defendant's expert,
notwithstanding his lack of education, was sufficiently experienced to
withstand a Daubert challenge.94 The majority rejected any suggestion
that it was supplanting the district court's gatekeeper role, noting the
distinction between admissible expert testimony and "'shaky but
admissible evidence."'9 5 The expert's conclusions may have been shaky,
but they were admissible.'
In the case of "shaky but admissible"
opinion testimony, cross-examination
is the traditional and appropriate
97
means of attack, not exclusion.

88. Id.
89. Id. at 1264-65. The district court rejected defendant's contention that the
prosecution had not timely identified these witnesses as expert witnesses, ruling that
notice is only required when the prosecution calls an expert witness during its case-in-chief.
Id. at 1265.
90. Id. at 1265.
91. Id. at 1266.
92. Id. at 1266-67.
93. Id. at 1266.
94. Id. at 1267-68.
95. Id. at 1268 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596).
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596).
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In his dissent, Judge Marcus argued that the majority had "eviscerate[d] the critical gatekeeping role played by the trial court in determining the admissibility of expert opinion testimony and unapologetically
substitute[d] its own reliability assessment for that of the district court
...."98 Judge Marcus opined that the majority completely misunderstood the district court's rationale for excluding the evidence.99 The
district court did not question the expert's qualifications, but rather
disallowed the expert's opinion because the opinion failed to meet the
reliability prong of the City of Tuscaloosa test.'00 Judge Marcus
believed the expert essentially intended to testify that in a rape, "it
would be expected"1 ' that hair or bodily fluids would be found on a
victim and because such evidence was not found, the victim was not
In Judge Marcus's examination of the record, the district
raped.'
court clearly and unsuccessfully searched for some scientific or other
Judge
foundation to support the reliability of this testimony.0 3
Marcus noted that this support need not be scientific in nature; for
example, the expert could testify that based on his experience, hair or
fluids were found on rape victims in a certain percentage of cases. 104
Depending on that percentage, the district court properly could have
allowed the expert to testify that because of the absence of such
evidence, no forensic evidence supported the rape allegation.0 5
However, the expert did not offer any such support for his opinion. No
evidence of the reliability of the expert's opinion existed; therefore, Judge
Marcus concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it excluded the expert's opinion. 0 6
Rule 701107 governs lay opinion testimony, and in 2000 the Supreme
Court amended Rule 701 to provide that lay opinion testimony cannot
be "based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within
the scope of Rule 702.""° As discussed in a previous survey,10 9 the
amendment, on its face, appears to bar lay opinion testimony based on

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1274 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1271 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1271-72 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1272 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1272-73 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1273 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1274 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
Id. (Marcus, J., dissenting).
Id. (Marcus, J., dissenting).
FED. R. EVID. 701.
Id. at 701(c).
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 53 MERCER L. REv. 1399, 1408 (2002).
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a witness's prior experience. 11° The Eleventh Circuit addressed this
issue in United States v. Novaton,"' which was tried before the
effective date of the 2000 amendment. The court held that law
enforcement agents, based on their experience, could testify about the
meaning of certain jargon used by defendants."' The Eleventh Circuit
rejected defendants' argument that because the testimony was based on
the agent's prior experiences, it was not proper lay testimony, but rather
should have been evaluated as expert testimony under Rule 702."'
The Eleventh Circuit, relying on pre-amendment case law, held that the
agent's testimony was proper lay testimony, but left open the question
of whether the 2000 amendment would require a different conclusion." 4
The Eleventh Circuit returned to this issue during this survey period
in Tampa Bay Ship Building & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co." 5
In Tampa Bay, defendant contended that the district court improperly
allowed plaintiffs to testify that their charges for work performed were
reasonable. Defendant contended plaintiffs' testimony was in effect
and only properly qualified experts could
based upon industry standards,
6
give such testimony."
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the 2000 amendment to Rule
701 was intended, as the Advisory Committee noted, "'to eliminate the
risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be
evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay
However, the Advisory Committee also noted
witness clothing.' ""'
that business owners or officers could testify as lay witnesses: "Such
opinion testimony is admitted not because of experience, training or
specialized knowledge within the realm of an expert, but because of the
particularized knowledge that the witness has by virtue of his or her
position in the business. The amendment does not purport to change
this analysis.""' This established, to the satisfaction of the Eleventh
Circuit, that "opinion testimony by business owners and officers is one
of the prototypical areas intended to remain undisturbed."1 9

110. Id.
111. 271 F.3d 968 (11th Cir. 2001).
112. Id. at 1009.
113. Id.; see FED. R. EVID. 702.
114. Novaton, 271 F.3d at 1008-09.
115. 320 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2003).
116. Id. at 1215-16.
117. Id. at 1222 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701 Advisory Committee's notes).
118. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701 Advisory Committee's notes).
119. Id.
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Interestingly, although the Eleventh Circuit based its holding on
Advisory Committee notes relating specifically to business owners and
officers, the Eleventh Circuit equated its conclusion that the disputed
testimony was not within the scope of Rule 702 with its holding in
Novaton.120 "Like the police officers in Novaton .. ., Tampa Bay's
witnesses testified based upon their particularized knowledge garnered
from years of experience within the field." 12' The implication is that
although Novaton was a pre-amendment case, its holding survives the
amendment to Rule 701 even though no precise guidance from the
amendment or Advisory Committee notes exists, unlike guidance with
regard to testimony by business owners or officers.
V.

HEARSAY

Defendants in United States v. Hasner12 2 raised a creative, albeit
futile, argument in an attempt to convince the Eleventh Circuit that the
district court erroneously admitted co-conspirator statements under Rule
801(d)(2)(E). 123 In Hasner the district court, as is commonly done,
provisionally admitted alleged co-conspirator statements offered by the
prosecution subject to the prosecution later establishing the elements of
the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Defendants argued that
the discretion to provisionally admit co-conspirator statements was
abolished by a 1997 amendment to Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 124 The Eleventh
The 1997 amendment simply
Circuit rejected this argument. 25
codified the holding of Bourjaily v. United States.126 In Bourjaily the
Supreme Court held that the contents of a co-conspirator statement must
a
be considered by district courts in determining the existence of 127
conspiracy.
the
in
participation
declarant's
the
and
conspiracy
While the amendment also provided that the contents of the statement
could not alone be sufficient to establish the conspiracy, nothing in
Bourjaily or the 1997 amendment addressed the issue of whether coconspirators' statements could be provisionally admitted. 2 '

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 1223.
Id.
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"Like the brute Mongo in Mel Brooks's 1974 comedy classic Blazing
Saddles, Roberto Duran once knocked out a horse with a single
punch."129 If ever an opening sentence in a judicial opinion grabbed
readers' attention, this one from the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
3°
United States v.Samaniego"
is it. The opinion, which reads more
like a New Yorker piece than a judicial decision, provides a fascinating
synopsis of Duran's remarkable thirty-four year boxing career and the
championship belts he won in four different weight classes. 131 Tragically, those championship belts were stolen from132his home by his
brother-in-law, and that is the point of the decision.
The federal government, in a sting operation, came into possession of
the belts and filed an interpleader action to determine the belts' rightful
owner. The critical issue was whether the belts had been stolen, and the
strongest evidence was the hearsay statements of the alleged thief,
admitted through the testimony of Duran and several members of his
family. Specifically, these witnesses testified that the brother-in-law
apologized in their presence for stealing the belts. 13 The district court
admitted this testimony pursuant to Rule 803(3),13 which allows the
admission of a declarant's out of court statement concerning his "then
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition
.... ,13' The jury sided with Duran, and it seemed the belts would be
returned to the man who had worked so hard and long to earn them.
Unfortunately, the memorabilia dealer, who claimed he had come by the
belts honestly, appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit held that the district
court erred when it relied on Rule 803(3) to admit the brother-in-law's
apology. Thus, it appeared that Duran, having
successfully fought to
136
regain his belts, was only to lose them again.
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that while Rule 803(3) permits the
admission of a statement that shows state of mind, the rule does not
13
permit evidence demonstrating the reason for the state of mind.
The brother-in-law's statement, while evidence of his remorseful state of
mind, also established why his mind was in that state-for instance,
3 8
that he was remorseful because he had stolen the belts."
Clearly, the
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134.
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United States v. Samaniego, 345 F.3d 1280, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1281.
Id. at 1281-82.
Id. at 1282.
FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
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statement was offered to prove the brother-in-law had stolen the belts,
not that he was remorseful. Therefore, the apology was not admissible
pursuant to Rule 803(3).139
But Duran was only down, not out, and the story was to have a happy
ending. Although Rule 803(3) was not applicable, the Eleventh Circuit
proceeded to consider whether the brother-in-law's apology was a
statement against interest by a declarant unavailable at trial and
admissible under Rule 804(b)(3).' 40 Clearly, to the Eleventh Circuit,
the statement was against the brother-in-law's interest because the
41
statement would "subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability."
However, for the statement to be admissible, Duran had to establish that
his brother-in-law was unavailable pursuant to Rule 804(a). 42 Of the
five tests of unavailability set forth in Rule 804(a), only one was relevant
to the court's inquiry: whether the brother-in-law was "absent from the
hearing and [Duran] has been unable to procure the declarant's
3
" 14
attendance (... or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
In this regard, Duran's wife, the alleged thief's sister, testified that she
and her mother had tried to locate her brother on five occasions, but
they had been unsuccessful.'" The mother also testified that she had
once tried to contact her son but was unable to locate him. 145 This
testimony, the Eleventh Circuit held, was "a reasonable means of
attempting to locate Iglesias in Panama and persuade him to travel to
the United States to testify."146 The district court rightfully admitted
the apology, albeit
for the wrong reason, and Duran's quest came to a
47
successful end.

Rule 801(b)(1)(B) 148 provides that a prior consistent statement is not
hearsay if the statement is offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication, improper influence, or motive. 49 For example, a party may use
a witness's prior statement that is consistent with his trial testimony to
demonstrate that the trial testimony is truthful. In Tome v. United
States,5 ' the Supreme Court, resolving a conflict among the circuits,
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held that a prior consistent statement is not admissible to rebut a charge
the prior statement was made before the
of recent fabrication unless
51
motive to fabricate arose.
In United States v. Prieto,52 the Eleventh Circuit addressed an issue
of first impression spawned by Tome. 5 3 In Prieto the prosecution
successfully tendered a witness's post-arrest statement, which was
consistent with his trial testimony, to rebut a charge that the trial
testimony was tainted by the witness's agreement to cooperate with the
government in exchange for a more lenient punishment.'5 4 The postarrest statement was made before the execution of the cooperation
agreement, but defendant argued "any post arrest statement is
necessarily tinged with a motive to lie in order to curry favor with the
government." 5 5 In other words, as the Eleventh Circuit described, the
defense sought the creation of a "bright line, per se rule barring the
admission of any prior consistent statements made by a witness
following arrest." 5 6 The Eleventh Circuit declined to adopt such a
rule, holding that post-arrest statements are not automatically contaminated by a motive to fabricate.'57 Rather, a witness's post-arrest
statement can be driven by a variety of motives and reasons. Thus,
whether a post-arrest statement is motivated by a desire to obtain
favorable treatment depends on the facts surrounding the statement and
must necessarily be decided on a case-by-case basis.'
During the current survey period, a defendant in United States v.
Drury'5 9 contended that the district court violated Prieto because the
court applied a "bright line test" and excluded a prior consistent
statement made by a witness for the defense. 6 ° Although the Eleventh Circuit could not find the precise reason in the record, or for that
matter even a general reason, for the district court's exclusion of the
testimony, the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless held that the record was
sufficient to establish that defendant had adequate6 "motive and
opportunity to fabricate" his prior consistent statement.1 '
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344 F.3d 1089 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated by 358 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2004).
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Thus, in determining the admissibility of a prior consistent statement
to rebut a suggestion that trial testimony is false, the critical factor is
whether the witness had a motive to fabricate at the time he made the
63
prior statement. 16 2 Yet, in United States v.Ettinger,'
the Eleventh
Circuit did not address this element."
In Ettinger defendant, who
was charged with assaulting a federal officer, contended that the district
court improperly admitted, as a prior consistent statement, a statement
made by an officer who witnessed the assault. 6 ' When this officer
prepared his report on the day of the assault, the officer did not mention
an alleged statement by defendant to the victim that defendant was
"'going to get him.""
However, at trial, the officer testified that he
heard defendant say, after the assault, that defendant had told his
victim that defendant was "'going to get him."" 67 When defendant's
counsel pointed out on cross-examination that the officer had not
mentioned this statement in his report, the district court allowed the
government to introduce a statement the witness gave to an FBI agent,
which did include defendant's threat to his victim. Although the trial
court did not indicate as such, obviously that statement
to the FBI agent
68
was made after the officer prepared his report. 1
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the statement was
"admitted properly to rebut an implied charge of recent fabrication,
pursuant to [Rule] 801(d)(1)(B)."'6 9 The Eleventh Circuit did not
discuss whether the statement was made before or after the witness may
have developed a motive to fabricate. 7 ° However, defendant's point
seemed to be that the officer had not included the statement in his
official report, made the day of the assault. Also, the fact that the officer
later told an FBI agent about the threat does not rebut defendant's
specific point, that if the statement had been made, the statement
logically would have been included in the report. Presumably, the
prosecution contended that the prior consistent statement to the FBI
agent was admissible to rebut the suggestion that because the threat
was not mentioned in the officer's report, the threat must have been

Drury, 358 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2004). The reason for granting the motion was not stated.
Id. at 1280.
162. See Drury, 344 F.3d at 1108-09.
163. 344 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2003).
164. Id. at 1149.
165. Id. at 1160.
166. Id. at 1152.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1152-53.
169. Id. at 1161.
170. Id. at 1160-61.
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fabricated. Defendant likely countered that the officer, by the time the
FBI entered the picture, probably would have been inclined to embellish
did not mention these
his story. 17 ' But, because the Eleventh Circuit
172
contentions and issues, we will never know.

171. Id.
172. Id.

*

*

*

